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Introduction
In this paper the analytical method Failure Modes and Effects Simulation (FMES) is introduced and its use in reliability analysis and producing automatically generated failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) is explained. The first two sections introduce FMEA and demonstrate how it is used in conjunction with reliability analysis tools. The third section recalls the concept of reliability model generation and automated FMEA that was pioneered by the Reliability Model Generator [4] [5] . The fourth section defines the FMES technique and how it can be used in conjunction with reliability analysis. The final section presents results that have been obtained using a software tool REST which has been designed specifically for FMES analysis.
Failure Mode and Effects Analvsis
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) and its associate Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) are methods that have been used by the avionics and aerospace community to assess system vulnerability to component failure [1] [2] [3] . These analyses are typified by a bottom-up approach where a failure mode of a low -eve1 component is assumed and its subsequent effect on system performance deduced.
This process can be generalized if we consider two components, C1 and C2 (see figure 1) . Under normal circumstances, C1 receives its input, I, produces output C1(I) and delivers this output to C2. C2, receiving a nominal input from C1, operates within specification.
To perform an M A , we would consider a failure mode of C 1, say C1'. Component C1 now produces output Cl,(I). The effect of the failure of C1 is assessed by reevaluating C2 with respect to the input Cl'. C2 may or may not continue to operate within specification. This process of propagating the component failure effect continues until it is determined that either the failure is "covered, i.e., the error effect is contained, or a system malfunction results.
As an example, consider the case where C1 is a resistor and C2 a light emitting diode (LED). These components could be used, for example, as a light source for a sensor application. If the resistor fails such that there is no current output (an open circuit), then the LED will cease to function. This could probably be considered a safe failure in that the complete lack of emissions from the sensor signal could be detected. If the resistor fails such that the current exceeds the LED's nominal rating (a short circuit), there would not be an immediate erroneous effect. However, the failure rate of the LED would now be increased with the result that a subsequent failure of the LED would cause a "safe" lack of emissions.
This type of analysis can be done quantitatively or qualitatively, i.e., with or without regard for the probability of the events occurring. In a qualitative analysis, a system is evaluated as being either Fail-safe, Fail-Operational Fail Safe, or Fail-Operational Fail-Operational Fail-safe. The Fail-Op Fail-Op Fail-safe qualification is done for flight critical systems. Given a system of N components with a high degree of integration and, therefore, many state dependencies, a Fail-Op Fail-Op Fail Safe evaluation could take on the order of N factorial analyses.
Using Reliabilitv Analvsis with FMEA
The benefit of a quantitative analysis is that, as system unreliability (probability of being unsafe) is computed, many failure event sequences can be terminated because their probability of Occurence becomes insignificant. A quantitative analysis can be done using a Markov model where component failure rates determine the probability of system state transitions. Several Markov analysis software tools are available. 01 interest to the discussion here is the SURE tool developed at NASA Langley Research Center [8]. An example of using SURE follows.
Returning to the resistor/LED sensor, consider the SURE models in figure la. This model shows the 3 failure events that are possible from the fully operational state, state 1 . Having completed a first level FMEA, we would know that end states 2 and 3 are death states, i.e., the system no longer functions in these states, and that state 4 is an operational state. Before continuing with the analysis of state 4, the model is evaluated. Suppose the component failure rates are as follows ResistorFailOpen = 1 .OE-6; ResistorFailShort = 1 .OE-6; LEDFailNominal = 1 .OE-6; LEDFailOverDriveri = 1 .OE-2;
The end state probabilities become It appears in this case that further expansion is necessary (see figure Ib). The LED failure rate will increase to LEDFailOverDriven after the resistor fails shorted. The Tranto statements contain three parts: a condition, an effect and a rate. The LED Tranto statements are straightforward and describe the fact that the LED will fail by its nominal rate unless it is being overdriven. The resistor Trantos are more interesting in that their effect sections also include the repsonse of the LED to the resistor failure. The resistor FMEA rules thus become specialized by the components to which the resistor is attached.
Although it may seem trivial in this example, this inter-dependency of the rule base makes larger and more complex models harder to create, maintain and understand. For example, if the characteristics of the LED change, then the analyst must search the model for all places where another component might have an effect on an LED of this type. Note that a component does not have to be directly connected to another to have a failure effect on that component. As we shall see, this weakness is addressed in the automated FMEA techniques used in the FMES methodology.
Automated FMEA in RMG
One of the tasks of the Integrated AirframePropulsion Control System Architecture program (IAPSA) [lo] was to do the reliability analysis of the proposed system design. The ASSIST/SURE tools were chosen for this analysis. During the course of the analysis two things were observed. First, the ASSIST language was foreign to system designers and thus impeded their use of the tool. Second, the order and regularity of the ASSIST transition rules made it appear that the ASSIST reliability model could be automatically generated. More specifically, it was speculated that the ASSIST reliability model could be automatically generated from a block diagram description of the system. This is preferred because system designers would find a reliability analysis tool easier to use if the model could be expressed in terms of a block diagram.
A system block diagram is an interconnected set of discrete components. If a reliability model is to be generated from a system block diagram, it becomes immediately apparent that the system FMEA must first be generated from that same description.
It was decided to study the design of an expert system for just such a purpose.
Such an algorithm was defined and embodied in the Reliability
Model Generator (RMG) [4] [5] prototype. RMG was used to successfully produce accurate ASSIST models from block diagram descriptions (models that were in some cases more accurate than hand coded models) [6] . The algorithm is based on a characterization of B component (or subsystem) as follows:
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Components Not getting bogged down in the exact syntactic details of RMG, the resistor and LED components can be characterized as shown in figure 4 (Ignore the bolded entries as they are part of the RML The resistor definition (figure 4a) is straightforward and very similar to the ASSIST definition except, of course, for the output specification. The ON condition signifies that the output transition rule is enable only once, that is when the condition becomes true for the first time. Notice also the lack of any reference to the LED.
The LED (figure 4b) is more interesting. As specified by the ON statements, both mode and output transitions can be triggered by input transitions, i.e., resistor current effects. Note that the LEDs output is None if either the LED fails or the input Current is None.
The LEDs dependency on the resistor current is completely specified in the LED module.
RMG was written in an expert shell that provided a graphical interface in which the user is able to define module types such as the resistor and LED above. To create the system description, the module types are instantiated as actual components and interconnected, i.e., the resistor output is connected to the LED input. To complete the system description, a system component is added and connected to the LED output. The system component creates specific requirements. For the case of a single LED, the system is considered to be failed if the LED is not emitting light.
Module: System; Mode: State = (Nominal, Fail); Input: Light = (Nominal, None, Bright); syntax).
Output: System = (Nominal, Fail); ModeTransition:
OutputTransition:
The reliability model is generated by defining a state space, reducing Deathif conditions and assembling Tranto statements. The state space is simply the set of component mode variables.
The Deathif statements are constructed by taking those conditions that cause the system output to fail and then backward chaining through the system until the conditional expression is in terms of mode variables. In OUT resistor/LED example we would start with the System OutputTransition which specifies that the System fails when the System Mode variable System.State is equal to Fail. From here we trace back as follows. The RMG program generated much more cryptic names.
In practice RMG generated highly accurate models [6]. One feature of the models is hinted at in the example model in figure 3. i.e., the system failure conditions are written in low-level terms. As has been observed in practice, when an analyst codes directly in ASSIST, the tendency is to write the Deathif conditions in highlevel terms and encode the effects in the Tranto statements as in figure 2. This method of modeling holds more information. In the RMG model, information is lost. We know that a resistor failing open is system failure, but do not know why. In the process of generating the reliability model, the FMEA was not retained thus impeding verification of the analysis.
Several other aspects of RMG limited its usefulness. RMG was written in an expert shell which, although it had a graphical interface, too often presented the shell's formidable internals to the user. This made RMG difficult to use. The RMG ASSIST models were much larger than manually coded models (due partially to the Deathif expansions) and often required long generation times. The larger ASSIST models caused longer ASSIST processing times and, in one case, could not be processed at all due to memory restrictions. These factors led to the extension of the RMG algorithm into Failure Modes and Effects Simulation. here. See [7] for a more thorough description.)
Failure Modes and Effects Simulation
Resistor: RI; LED: LEDl ; System: System; Connect(R1 .Current, LEDl .Current); Connect(LED1 .Light, System.Light);
Assuming that resistor and LED modules have been defined, instantiated and connected in RML, the process begins by constructing a simulation executable. The system state space, a set of mode transition rules and a set of Deathif rules are assembled from the system components as was done in RMG. Because RML retains the module input/output information, the mode transition and system failure rules can be copied verbatim making this process straight forward.
At system start, the state space is as follows.
R1.PhyiscalState = Nominal; LEDl .PhyiscalState = Nominal; System.PhysicalState = Nominal;
The simulation then begins by first evaluating the Deathif statements and then expanding the mode transitions. For the purpose of illustration, we will trace the R1.Short sequence. Where the first column of numbers are the bounds on probability of failure for that particular sequence and the second column is a cumulative total. To view the complete FMEA a trace output can be obtained. Having the probability of occurrence of a failure event sequence available in the FMES output aids in the inspection of large complex systems by reducing the number of sequences that must be considered. An additional benefit of the FMES technique is that demand for computer memory resources during the analysis is greatly reduced, making the analysis of large system possible. The results of the analysis of a significant part of the IAPSA architecture follows.
Results
The Reliability Estimation System Testbed (REST) [7] was developed to probe the use of RML and FMES. A target system architecture was taken from the IAPSA study. The architecture consists of a quad fault tolerant computer connect to 2 reconfiguring mesh networks. Four quad redundant I/O devices are attached to the network.
Modules can represent both physical and logical components.
Logical components contribute functionality to the design definition but are not associated with a failure rate. An example of a logical component is the Voter which has unique functionality yet is considered to be an integral part of the Processor, i.e., when the Voter fails the Processor fails. A second logical module type is the redundancy manager algorithm. Ten module types were defined for this model.
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.
Processor: This is the CPU processing unit. It has one failure mode transition labeled Fail. Voter: This inter channel majority voting device retains error data and allows channels to be disabled. This is a logical component. This is the first and most probable sequence in the SummaryByType report. Two processor failures are each followed by FTP and network recoveries. The third processor failure brings system failure. This is a "lack of spares" failure sequence, i.e., the system ran out of spare processors. In the event of two processor failures and no recoveries, we would expect a "lack of coverage" failure due to voter error. In fact we find this event sequence
(Processor,Fail)(Processor,Fail)(System,Net) [ 1.10E-10. [5.18E-12,5.28E-12] These sequence describe the events where a node or link fails on one network and then a node or link fails on the other network, thus disabling both networks. These sequences could be viewed in the lowest level of detail, "Detailed Events", where events are recorded without grouping. The four sequences would expand into nearly 2,000 event sequences in the Detailed Events report and yield virtually no more information.
Concluding Remarks
The FMES method merges FMEA and reliability analysis providing an alternative approach to system safety analysis. FMES has been shown to be computationally efficient in calculating reliability without sacrificing accuracy. The output of an FMES analysis yields indepth information about the system failure effects as well as the probability that these effects will occur. This output aids in understanding system and model behavior. On more than one occasion the FMES approach has produced analyses which uncovered errors in hand-generated models. The modularity of FMES models makes the FMES expandable and reusable. These combined factors lead to the conclusion that FMES can be used with confidence in practical applications.
